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Abstract
The aim of this article is to construct a deontic logic in which the free
choice postulate [11] would be consistent and all the implausible result
mentioned in [5] will be blocked. To achieve this we first developed a
new theory of action. Then we build a new deontic logic in which the
deontic action operator and the deontic proposition operator are explicitly
distinguished.
1 Background and orientation
1.1 Background discussion
Deontic logic is a field of logic that lets one reason about deontic concepts, such
as obligations and permissions. SDL (Standard Deontic Logic) is a modal logic
established by von Wright [18] to reason about such concepts. This logic has
had difficulties and limitations and became outdated with the emergence of the
DSDL (Dyadic Standard Deontic Logic) in 1969 by Hansson [4]. Nevertheless,
our original idea to create a logic of action in order to reason about permis-
sions and obligations comes from the analysis of paradoxes encountered while
reasoning in SDL (Section 3.2). Traditional SDL uses the KD possible world
semantics. Its models have the form (S,R, o) where R ⊆ S2 is the accessibility
relation, o ∈ S is the actual world and we have that ∀x∃y(xRy) holds. Figure
1 is a typical situation in the semantics. (In this figure, an arrow from x to y
indicates xRy, and the labels on the arrows will be referred later, readers should
ignore them here).
To evaluate a modal formula for example o  ♦♦q,1 one has to find two
worlds a,b such that oRa∧ aRb and b  q. The point of view of SDL about this
model is the following:
1. View the model from above. The model (S,R, o) is static and we evaluate
deontic formulas in it.
2. The set of worlds It = {x|tRx} is interpreted as a set of ideal worlds
relative to t.
1In modal logic we use  and ♦ := ¬¬. In deontic logic, it is traditional to use © and
P := ¬©¬
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Figure 1: Typical representation in SDL
From this last point it follows that ©q (read as obligatory q), holds at t if and
only if q holds in all the ideal worlds in It.
The new action-based solution we are presenting in this paper is more dynamic.
It is the following:
When we evaluate ©q at t we actually consider ourselves as living in world t
performing actions which enable us to go to ideal worlds in It.
Let the annotations a,a′,b,b′ be the actions that can be taken in order to move
from one world to another (from now on, bold faces symbols will be considered
as actions). Then if we follow the model presented in Figure 1, from world o we
could take for example the action a and move to world s. The action has the
effect of taking us to world s.
One of the main problems with formalizing Px (read x is permitted) is the
intuitive rule
P (x ∨ y)↔ Px ∧ Py
(The so called Free choice postulate). This together with another intuitive rule
©x→ Px
and the rule
x ` y implies © x ` ©y
yield
©x ` ©(x ∨ y) ` P (x ∨ y) ` Py
In other words, If there is any obligation, then anything is permitted! 2
The above problem arises when we interpret x and y as variables ranging over
formulas getting truth values in possible worlds, and we interpret x being oblig-
atory as x being true in all ideal worlds.
The problem can disappear if apply deontic operators to actions instead of
propositions. For two actions a and b, intuitively P (a ∨ b)↔ Pa ∧ Pb should
hold, while©a→©(a∨b) should not hold , here a∨b is the composite action
which could be either a or b. We could also assume
©a ∧©b→©(a ∧ b)
2Similar observation can be found in [14]
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Where a ∧ b means that both actions are taken in parallel.
This paper presents an action based deontic logic which solves the free choice
paradox. For other deontic action logic the readers are refered to [12][2][15]
The structure of this paper is as following. In section 2 we introduce our
theory of action. In section 3.2 we discuss the paradoxes of permission and in
Section 3.3 we describe our solution to tackle the implausibility results presented
in section 3.2. In Section 4 we present an action based approach to deontic logic
proposed by van der Meyden and discuss its limitations, and we will see how
our approach extends that the one of van der Meyden.
2 Action Based Deontic Model
2.1 A Theory of Action
2.1.1 Actions, the relational version
In the literature of action based deontic logic like [12, 13], [2] and [15], actions
are treated as Boolean algebras. Here we develop a new theory of action which
generalizes their approach. Our intuition is to view an action as a change from
a state to another state, possibly via other intermediary states.
Given a set S of states, an action a is a set of sequences over S. In this section
we concentrate on simple actions which is a set of sequences of length 2. We
will represent it by a set of ordered pairs, that is, for a simple action a, a ⊆ S×S.
The simplest action is a single ordered pair {(s1, s2)}, where s1 and s2 are
states. We call such action particle action. The first component of a particle
action a = {(s1, s2)} is called the pre-condition of a, formally pre(a) = {s1}.
The second component of an particle action a is called the post-condition of a,
formally post(a) = {s2}. Intuitively, a particle action is a deterministic change
from a specific state. For example we can let s1 represents “Israel” and s2
represents “China”, then the action {(s1, s2)} is simply “go to China when you
are in Israel”.
With particle actions in hand, we build atomic action as a union of particle
actions which share the same pre-condition. For particle actions a1 = {(s1, s2)}
and a2 = {(s1, s3)}, a3 = {(s1, s2), (s1, s3)} is the atomic action consisted of
a1 and a2. The pre-condition of an atomic action is the same as its consisted
particle actions. The post condition of an atomic action is the union of the
post conditions of its consisted particle actions. Therefore post(a3) = {s2, s3}.
Intuitively, an atomic action is a nondeterministic change from a specific state.
For example, if we let s1 represents “China”, s2 represents “USA”, and s3
represents “Canada”, then a3 means “go to north America when you are in
China”.
A non-atomic action is a union of atomic actions which bears different pre-
conditions. For example, let s1 be “England” and s2 be “France”, then a =
{(s1, s2), (s2, s1)} is a non-atomic action which can be read as “go to France
when you are in England, or, go to England when you are in France”.(See
Figure 2)
For a non-atomic action, its post-condition is sensitive to the starting point
of its execution. More accurately, if a is executed in state t, the then post-
3
Figure 2: action actiona = {(s1, s2), (s2, s1)}
condition of a from the standpoint of t is the post-condition of the maximal
atomic action of a with pre-condition t.
2.1.2 Operators on Actions
Let a be an atomic action. We can compute post(a) and write a = {(s, t)|t ∈
post(a)}. Define ¬a = {(s, t)|t ∈ S − post(a)}3 to be the action of refraining
from doing a. Intuitively, ¬a has the same pre-condition as a but the post-
condition is the set theoretic complement of post(a). Therefore an action is
atomic iff its negation is atomic.
If a is a non-atomic action, then we calculate ¬a in the following way: First
we decompose a to its maximal atomic actions. Then for each of its maximal
atomic action ai, we calculate ¬ai. Then we take the union of these ¬ai to form
¬a.
Let a, b be two actions. Then a ∨ b, read as “a or b” is the union of all
their particle actions. For example, if a = {(s1, s1)} which means stay in s1
when you are in s1, b = {(s1, s2)} which means go to s2 when you are in s1,
then a∨b={(s1, s1), (s1, s2)} which means when you are in s1, stay there or go
to s2. See Figure 3:
Figure 3: a ∨ b = {(s1, s1), (s1, s2)}
We define a ∧ b, read as “do a and b in parallel”, to be their intersection.
For example if a={(s1, s1), (s1, s2)} and b = {(s1, s2), (s1, s3)}, then a ∧ b =
{(s1, s2)}. See Figure 4: A more concrete example is following: let a be “go to
English speaking countries when you are in China” and let b be “go to Europe
when you are in China”, then a ∧ b means ”go to England when you are in
China”.
With the above definition we can prove a is not equivalent to (a∧b)∨ (a∧¬b).
Fore example let S = {s1, s2}, a = {(s1, s1)}, b = {(s2, s1)}. Then ¬b =
{(s2, s2)}, a ∧ b is empty and a ∧ ¬b is also empty. See Figure 5:
3Note that we use the logical connective ¬,∧,∨ as algebraic operators on actions. The role
of these operator is always clear from context.
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Figure 4: a ∧ b = {s1, s2)}
Figure 5: a 6= (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ ¬b)
If we fix a state s, then the set of all atomic actions with s as their pre-
condition, together with ¬, ∧, ∨ forms a Boolean algebra, which is the approach
of [12],[2] and [15].
2.2 Deontic Action/Proposition Logic
2.2.1 Language
Given a finite set A = {a1 . . .an} of atomic actions, and a countable set Q =
{p, q, r, . . .} of proposition letters. The language of our deontic action/proposition
logic (DAPL) can be defined in BNF in the following way:
1. a ::= ai|¬a|a ∧ a|a ∨ a
2. ϕa ::= ©a|P a|¬ϕa|ϕa ∧ ϕa
3. ϕp ::= >|p|¬ϕp|ϕp ∧ ϕp| © ϕp|Pϕp
4. ϕ ::= ϕa|ϕp|¬ϕ|ϕ ∧ ϕ
Intuitively, the symbols of type a represent actions build from the set A of
atomic actions. Here we require A to be closed under ¬, i.e. for every a ∈ A,
there exist b ∈ A such that ¬a = b. We add this requirement because the
negation of an atomic action is always an atomic action as we observed from
the previous section.
The symbols of type ϕa are the deontic formula about actions and ϕp the
factual and deontic formula about propositions. Symbols of type ϕ are formulas
we will actually deal with. They are the Boolean combination of ϕa and ϕp.
From now on when we state A is a formula we always mean A is of type ϕ.
Note although the symbol ¬, ∧ appear several time in our notation, we can
always avoid confusion from the context. When applied to actions, the meaning
of ¬, ∧, ∨ are as defined in the previous section. When applied to formulas, no
matter for action or proposition, they are Boolean operators as usual.
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2.2.2 Semantics
We now present our semantics for the language of DAPL. We will define the
deontic operator for actions and propositions differently. Since we believe the
source of normativity of actions and that of propositions are different. The nor-
mativity of an action can arise simply from a given normative system; While
normativity of a proposition is usually related to ideal outcomes. But execut-
ing an obligatory/permitted action do not ensure the outcomes to be ideal.
Meanwhile we can achieve ideal outcomes by prohibited actions.
Intuitively, we consider an action to be obligatory( permitted) if there is a
legal document approving it to be obligatory(permitted). While a proposition
is obligatory if it is true in those ideal worlds or outcomes defined through oblig-
atory actions. We formalize this intuition as follows.
Let Q be a set of atomic propositions and let A be the set of symbols for
atomic actions and their negation. Let A+ be the closure of A under ¬,∧,∨.
We use q ∈ Q,a ∈ A+, t ∈ S as notation.
Definition 1 A deontic action/proposition model is a 4-tuple M = {S, IntAct,
IntPro, V }, where S is the set of possible worlds, IntAct is the interpreta-
tion of action, IntPro is the interpretation of proposition, V is the valua-
tion function of proposition letters. Here IntAct = (St,a, µ(t,a),Γt)t∈S,a∈A+ ,
IntAct = (Ft, Et)t∈S. They will be further defined below.
1. For each t ∈ S and a ∈ A, let St,a ⊆ S, which can be understood as the
post-condition of a when it is executed in t.
We call the function µ : S × A → 2S such that µ(t,a) ⊆ St,a a mean-
ing assignment function. Intuitively, the result of µ(t,a) is the set ideal
outcomes of action a when it is executed at t.
2. We can extend the definitions we gave in the above point involving ele-
ments of a to be applied to elements of A+ as follows.
St,a∨b = St,a ∪ St,b
St,a∧b = St,a ∩ St,b
We also define :
µ(t,a ∨ b) = µ(t,a) ∪ µ(t,b)
µ(t,a ∧ b) = µ(t,a) ∩ µ(t,b)
Here we need not define St,¬a and µ(t,¬a) since the negation of atomic
actions are in A, which has been defined previously. And the negation
of every non-atomic action can be decomposed to the union of atomic
actions.
3. Let Γt ⊆ {©a|a ∈ A+} ∪ {P a|a ∈ A+}. Intuitively Γt can be viewed as
the collection legal documents informing which actions are obligatory and
what actions are permitted.
We require that Γt satisfies the following
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• for every a ∈ A+, it is not the case that both ©a and ©¬a are in
Γt.
4These are axioms governing the atomic propositional symbols formed for all instances
from A+
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• if ©a and ©b are in Γt, then ©a∧b is in Γt.
• P a∨b is in Γt iff both P a and Pb are in Γt.
• if ©a is in Γt, then P a is in in Γt.
Note that we do not require ©a → ©a∨b. This will help us tackle some
of the paradoxes that will be discussed in a latter section.
4. For every state t, we define a neighborhood Ft using Γt and the meaning
assignment function µ as follows. Here a neighborhood of S is a family of
subsets of S, readers can consult [3] for further details.
(a) For each a ∈ A+, if ©a ∈ Γt, let µ(t,a) ∈ Ft.
(b) if x ∈ Ft and y ∈ Ft, let x ∩ y ∈ Ft.
Now we are ready to define the truth value of formulas of DAPL:
• t  q iff t ∈ V (q), q being atomic.
• t ©a iff ©a ∈ Γt.
• t  P a iff P a ∈ Γt.
• t ©A iff ||A|| ∈ Ft and ||A|| 6= ∅
• t  PA iff ||A|| ⊆ ⋃Ft = ⋃S′∈Ft S′
• t  ¬A iff it is not the case that t  A
• t  A ∧B iff t  A and t  B
Here ||A|| = {t ∈ S|t  A}. Intuitively, an action a is obligatory or permitted
if we have a legal document in Γt to approve it. A proposition is obligatory iff
there exist an obligatory action a such that the proposition is true in exactly
the ideal outcomes of a.5
Remark R1
1. The following holds in the semantics:
(a) ©A ∧©B →©(A ∧B)
(b) ©a ∧©b →©a∧b
(c) ©A→ PA
(d) ©a → P a
(e) P (A ∨B)↔ PA ∧ PB
(f) P a∨b → P a ∧ Pb
5This reminds us of what the Bible says, “Deuteronomy 4:2 Do not add to what I command
you and do not subtract from it, but keep the commands of the LORD your God that I give
you”
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2. We interpret t  ©A to mean you have to take an action at t which will
result in an approved set of possible states.(i.e ||A|| ∈ Ft). All the possible
resulting states have to be desirable and approved. Permission means you
are permitted to take an action for which the set of results is tolerable.
3. It may be the case that in Ft there exists a smallest non-empty set Ht such
that Ht =
⋂
Ft, in which case this suggests that we can take a stronger
semantics, which is a simplified version of our semantics in Definition 1,
whose models look like (S,R1, R2) where:
• tR1s iff s ∈ Ht
• tR2s iff s ∈ Et =
⋃
Ft
• We have R1 ⊆ R2.
• t  ©A iff for all s, if tR2s then (tR1s iff s  A).(This means that
Ht is exactly the subset of Et in which A holds)
• t  PA iff (∃s ∈ S such that tR1s and s  A), and (∀s, tR2s and
s  A imply tR1s).
iff (∃s, tR1s and s  A), and (if ∀s,¬tR1s ∧ tR2s then s 2 A)
iff (∃s, tR1s and s  A), and (∀s, if t(R2 − R1)s then s  ¬A) (This
means the subset of Et in which A holds is not empty and it is indeed
a subset of Ht).
Let NA be the modality for the relation R2−R1, then we have a bimodal
logic with two modalities, © for R1 and N for RN = R2 −R1, such that
R1 ⊆ RN or equivalently R1
⋂
RN = ∅. We have:
¬©¬A ∧ ¬©¬B → (P (A ∨B) ≡ PA ∧ PB)
.
4. The worlds of Ht are considered all good worlds, relative to t. The worlds
of Et−Ht are considered bad worlds from the point of view of t. ©A says
A is true exactly in all the good worlds and NA says A is true in all the
bad worlds. PA says A is permitted and it means that A is true in some
good world and it can be tolerated because N¬A holds, i.e. no world in
which A is true can be bad. We have ©A→ PA.
This should be compared with the subideal idea of Jones and Po¨rn [7].
They defined (using our notation) ought q by q is true in all R1 accessible
worlds as well as q being false in at least one (R2 −R1 ) accessible world.
We have then:
©q → ought q
However, their two relations R1 and R2 also satisfy uR1u ∨ uR2u and
they use their logic to deal with the Chisholm Paradox. See the Two
dimensional Deontic Logic paper [1] 6
6In models in which R2 −R1 has only one accessible world for each t, then our definition
is the same as Jones-Po¨rn. In fact in Section 3.3 of the Two dimensional Deontic Logic paper
, the authors do consider the same operator as our ©q of Definition D1 , which they call
ought∗q. The authors of that paper, however, had no thematic motivation for their ought,
but only local technical advantages.
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5. Note that the definition of satisfaction for ©A is :
t ©A iff ||A| = Ht
Thus we are using the neighborhood Ft = {Ht}
3 Free choice paradox in SDL
3.1 Free choice permissions
The semantic of a disjunctive permission generally refers to a choice that an
agent can make between different actions. As Hansson[5] pointed out in his
Handbook chapter ( section 5 ), there’s two different usage of disjunctive per-
mission.
The most common usage implies that one have the permission to do every ac-
tions included in the given disjunction.
P (a ∨ b)→ Pa ∧ Pb
For example:
“you may either eat the cake or drink the cup of coffee”
could be understand as : “There is some cake, and there is some coffee, so feel
free to chose one of them” (implicitly both of them or none if you want).
Now suppose that the person who has formulated the latter permission was
told that one may eat the cake only. It may be the case that this person un-
fortunately forgot whether it was the cake, or the coffee that was available for
consumption.
“you may either eat the cake or drink the cup coffee. But I unfortunately
forgot which.”
Then , the postulate P (a ∨ b) → Pa ∧ Pb doesn’t hold anymore, as we know
that the agent doesn’t have both permission. But we still know that the agent
can do at least one of the two actions. Thus a weaker postulate holds
P (a ∨ b)→ Pa ∨ Pb
The first usage ( the one generally implied while using common language) is
called by von Wright a Free choice permission [17]. We will see in the next
subsection that this free choice postulate taken together with SDL leads to
implausible results.
3.2 Paradoxes
Free choices as described in the previous subsection are something one would like
to incorporates in his logic, as it’s the most natural way a human will interpret a
disjunctive permission. Unfortunately several implausibility results where high-
lighted by different authors when the free choice postulate P (a∨ b)→ Pa∧Pb,
is taken into consideration with SDL. In this subsection we will list those im-
plausibility results.[5]
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Implausibility result 1: ©a→©(a ∧ b) [8]
Requirements: Extensionality and interdefinability (©a↔ ¬P¬a)
Derivation:
P (¬a ∨ ¬b)→ P¬a
P¬(a ∧ b)→ P¬a
¬P¬a→ ¬P¬(a ∧ b)
©a→©(a ∧ b)
Implausibility result 2: ©a→ Pb ([18])
Requirements: Extensionality, ©a→ Pa and ©a→©(a ∨ b)
Derivation:
P (a ∨ b)→ Pb
©(a ∨ b)→ Pb (since ©(a ∨ b)→ P (a ∨ b) )
©a→ Pb (since ©a→©(a ∨ b)
Implausibility result 3: Pa→ Pb[9]




¬©¬a→ ¬©¬(a ∨ b)
Pa→ P (a ∨ b)
Pa→ Pb (since P (a ∨ b)→ Pb
Implausibility result 4: Pa→ P (a ∧ b) [6]
Requirements: Extensionality
Derivation:
P ((a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ ¬b))→ P (a ∧ b) ∧ P (a ∧ ¬b)
Pa→ P (a ∧ b) ∧ P (a ∧ ¬b) (Extensionality)
Pa→ P (a ∧ b)
Several authors have tried to solve those implausibility results by introducing
a new permission operator Pc. This operator is defined in such a way that
Pca↔ ¬©¬a is not necessarily holding in order to block some of the previously
exposed paradoxes.
Free choices would then be expressed as follow
Pc(a ∨ b)↔ Pa&Pb
Implausibility results from 5 to 7 are paradoxes that occurs while using this
Free choice operator.
Implausibility result 5: ©a ∧ Pb→ Pc(a ∨ b) [19]
Requirements: Pc(a ∨ b)↔ Pa ∧ Pb and ©a→ Pa
Derivation:
©a ∧ Pb (assumption)
Pa ∧ Pb (Postulate ©a→ Pa)
Pc(a ∨ b) (definition of Pc)
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Implausibility result 6: ©a ∧©b→ Pc(a ∨ b) [4]
Requirements: Pc(a ∨ b)↔ Pa ∧ Pb and ©a→ Pa
Derivation:
©a ∧©b (assumption)
Pa ∧ Pb (Postulate ©a→ Pa)
Pc(a ∨ b) (definition of Pc)
Implausibility result 7: Pa→ Pc(a ∨ b) [4]
Requirements: Extensionality, Pc(a ∨ b) ↔ Pa ∧ Pb and Pa →
P (a ∨ b)
Derivation:
Pa (assumption)
Pa ∧ P (a ∨ b) (Postulate Pa→ P (a ∨ b))
Pc(a ∨ (a ∨ b)) (definition of Pc) Pc(a ∨ b)) (Extensionality)
To avoid those latter problems, von Wright proposed a system in which
Pc(a ∨ b)↔ Pca ∧ Pcb
whenever both a and b are contingent.
But this property leads to the following implausible results:
Implausibility result 8: Pc(a∨ b)∧Pc(c∨d)→ Pc(a∨ c) if a, b, c, and
d are contingent. [5]
Requirements: Extensionality, Pc(a ∨ b) ↔ Pca ∧ Pcb when a and b
are contingent.
Derivation:
Let a,b,c and d be contingent.
Pc(a ∨ b) ∧ Pc(c ∨ d) (assumption)
Pc(a) ∧ Pc(c)
Pc(a ∨ c)
Implausibility result 9: Pc(a ∨ b) ← Pc((a ∧ c) ∨ (b ∧ c)) if a, b, a ∧
c, a ∧ ¬c, b ∧ c and b ∧ ¬c are contingent. [5]
Requirements: Extensionality, Pc(a ∨ b) ↔ Pca ∧ Pcb when a and b
are contingent.
Derivation:
Let a,b and c be contingent.
Pc(a ∨ b) (assumption)
Pc((a ∧ c) ∨ (a ∧ ¬c)) ∧ Pc((b ∧ c) ∨ (b ∧ ¬c))
Pc(a ∧ c) ∧ Pc(b ∧ c)
Pc((a ∧ c) ∨ (b ∧ c))
In the next section, we will introduce a new concept that will hopefully allow
us to block all those implausibility results.
3.3 Paradoxes in our semantics
We now examine the status of the paradoxes (mentioned in section 3.2) in our
semantics. Can we derive these paradoxes in our semantics?
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We now check the validity of the paradoxes in our model.
Implausibility result 1 does not hold in our semantics. We can block it in
two ways because we have neither ©a↔ ¬P¬a nor ©a ↔ ¬P¬a.
Implausibility result 2 doesn’t hold since we do have neither ©a → ©(a ∨ b)
nor ©a →©a∨b.
Implausibility result 3 is blocked for the same reason we block implausibility
result 1.
Implausibility result 4 is blocked since we do not have P a → P (a∧b)∨(a∧¬b).
This can be illustrated in by Figure 5 in section 2.
Implausibility results 5 and 6 are not a problem to us as we think they are
acceptable.
Implausibility result 7 does not hold in our model because the essential assump-
tion P a → P a∧b does hold in our model.
Implausibility results 8 and 9 do not concern us because they involve Pc alone,
a connective not in our language. These do not hold for our P .
4 Extension and related work
One influential work on deontic action logic with the free choice axiom is van
der Meyden [16]. Quite different from our work up to now, van der Meyden
adopt sequential semantics [10] for dynamic logic. In this section, we will first
recapitulate van der Meydem’s work then extend our dynamic logic from re-
lational semantics to sequential semantics and build deontic logic on it. Such
logic will also solve the free choice paradox and extends van der Meyden’s work.
4.1 Van der Meyden’s Action Based Approach
Meyden’s paper uses a language with actions set A = {a, b, c, ...} and atomic
propositions set Q.
The operations on actions are α ∪ β (disjunction) , α;β ( concatenation of α
and β ) and α∗ (finite repeated concatenation of α), for α and β being action
expressions.
The connectives available are the classical Boolean connectives and the following
modal connectives.
< α > A,♦(α,A),Π(α,A)
Intuitively, < α > A means that starting from the current state, some execution
of the action α ends in a state in which A is true. ♦(α,A) asserts that A holds
after some execution of α which is not forbidden. Π(α,A) asserts that each
execution of α which ends in a state satisfying A is permitted.
A model as the form (S,R, V, τ), where (S,R, V ) is an ordinary Kripke model
with valuation V and τ is an assignment to atomic actions. τ gives to each
atomic action a a set τ(a) of finite sequences of states. These sequences are of
the form (t1, ..., tn) ∈ τ(a). When the sequence satisfies : t1Rt2Rt3R...Rtn, we
say that the sequence is permitted. τ can be extended in the obvious way to
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the rest of the actions:
τ(α;β) = τ(α); τ(β)
τ(α ∪ β) = τ(α) ∪ τ(β)
τ(α∗) = τ(α)∗ = τ(α) ∪ (τ(α); τ(α)) ∪ (τ(α); τ(α); τ(α)) ∪ . . .
We write τt(α) for all the sequences in τ(α) of the form (t, t1, ..., tk), k > 0
We now define satisfaction in the model according to Meyden.
• t  q, for q atomic if t ∈ V (q)
• The usual definition for the Boolean connectives.
• t < α > A if for some sequence ((t, s1, ..., sk, r) ∈ τ(α) we have r  A
• t  ♦(α,A) if for some permitted sequence (t, s1, ..., sk, r) ∈ τ(α)we have
r  A
• t  Π(α,A) if whenever we have a sequence (t, s1, ..., sk, r) such that r  A,
then this sequence is permitted.
4.2 Sequential Semantics of Dynamic Logic
In section 2 we introduced a relational interpretation to actions, where an action
is interpreted by a set of ordered pairs of states. An ordered pair of states can
be understood as a sequence of state with length 2. In this section we extend
to general sequential interpretation without restrict the length of sequence to
be 2. In the sequential semantic of dynamic logic [10], an action is interpreted
by a set of sequence of states. Formally,
Definition 2 (Sequential model) A sequential model M = (W,RA, V ) is a
triple:
• W is a non-empty set of possible states.
• RA : A → 2W×W ∪ 2W×W×W ∪ 2W×...×W is an action interpretation
function, assigning a set of sequences over W to each action generator
a ∈ A. For technical reasons, we require the length of each sequence to be
at least 2.
• V is the valuation function for propositional letters.
The action interpretation function RA is extended to a new function R to
interpret arbitrary actions as in the relational version, except for the negation
operator.
For a sequence s =< s1, . . . , sn > with each si ∈ W , we define the pre-
condition of s to its first element s1, and post-condition to be its last elements
sn. The length of s, denote as |s|, is the number of appearance of states. We
call an action α molecular if it is interpreted by a set of sequences with the same
length. More formally, α is molecular if for every s, t ∈ R(α), |s| = |t|. The
action α is atomic if it is molecular and for all s, t ∈ R(α), the pre-condition
of s is the same as the pre-condition of t. For every atomic action α, we define
pre(α) to be the singular set of the pre-condition of its consisted sequences; we
13
let the post-condition of α to be the set of the post-conditions of its consisted
sequence; we let the length of α to be the length of its consisted sequence.
For an atomic action α of length n, we define the negation operators as
following:
• R(α) = pre(α)×W × . . .×W −R(α), here the appearance of W is n− 1
We can now define the negation of arbitrary actions. For every action α, we
calculate R(α) following those steps: (for notational convenience we use α to
represent the negation of action α)
1. decompose α to its maximal molecular sub-actions. That is, decompose α
to its sub-actions α1, . . . , αm such that R(α) = R(α1)∪ . . .∪R(αm), each
αi is molecular and there is no αi and αj with the same length.
2. for each molecular αi, divide it to its maximal atomic sub-actions. That
is, decompose αi to α
1
i , . . . , α
n
i such that R(αi) = R(α
1
i ) ∪ . . . ∪ R(αni ),




j with the same pre-condition.
3. for each atomic action αji , calculate R(α
j
i ).
4. let R(αi) = R(α1i ) ∪ . . . ∪R(αni )
5. let R(α) = R(α1) ∪ . . . ∪R(αm)
It can be verified that the above approach coincides with the relational ap-
proach for those actions α of length 2
Recall the meaning assignment function µ from Definition 1 in section 2.2.2,
here we define a simplified version.
Definition 3 (Simplified Meaning assignment function) Let µ′ : W →
22
W
be a simplified meaning assignment function such that for every w ∈ W ,
every element of µ′(w) is an ideal set worlds.
A general deontic action model M =< W,RA, µ′, V > is a deontic action model
with the interpretation function RA interprets actions to sequences of state. We
define




• M,w |= Oα iff M,w |= Pα and post(α) ∈ µ′(w)
Our logic extends van der Meyeden’s logic in the sense that the action negation
operator and the obligation operator are involved.
5 Concluding Discussion
In this paper we develop a new theory of action and based on that we build
a new deontic logic in which deontic action statement and deontic proposition
statement are explicitly distinguished. Our new logic validates the free choice
axiom, both for action and proposition, but all the implausible results sketched
in Hansson’s survey paper [5] are blocked.
For the futher work, a natural direction is to axiomatize our logic.
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